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This paper takes advantage of a rich firm level data set from Ecuador to analyze the effects of a 
reform in 2007 that introduced imprisonment for tax evasion and made a firm’s CFO liable for tax-crimes. 
Our dataset contains actual tax-return and financial-statement information for the universe of corporations in 
Ecuador from 2003 to 2007. We study the effects of higher punishment both at the intensive and extensive 
margins.  We  combine  a  difference-in-difference-in-difference  approach  with  the  DiNardo,  Fortin  and 
Lemieux decomposition method. This allows us to estimate the heterogeneous effects of the reform across the 
distribution of firms. We find that, at the intensive margin the reform led to an average 10% increase in real 
corporate tax payments. However, positive effects are only found at the right tail of the tax distribution (above 
the 75
th percentile). At the extensive margin, the probability of entry into the tax-net increased, but most of the 
firms that entered the tax net claimed zero taxes. 
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1. Introduction   
Tax  administration  and  compliance  have  long  been  the  weakest  links  in  tax  reform  in 
developing countries. In the last few decades, significant tax reform has been implemented in a large 
number of developing countries under the structural adjustment and stabilization programs of the 
World Bank and IMF. The focus of the reform has, however, been on the tax structure, i.e., tax bases 
and rates, most notably on introducing value-added tax (VAT) and reducing trade taxes (especially 
import tariff).
2 Although most of the tax reform programs include some administrative components, 
they are  usually accorded only a supportive role   at best. The widely implemented tax reform 
program that instituted  VAT as a main source of govern ment revenue  has, however, failed to 
compensate for the revenue loss due to drastic reduction in tariff rates, especially in poor developing 
countries (see, Baunsguaard and Keen (2010), Rajaraman (2004)).
3 This difficult fiscal predicament 
makes it especially important to  understand the revenue effects of tax administration   reform in 
developing countries; given a certain tax structure, how much difference a better monitoring (higher 
audit probability) or an increase in the punishment can make to government revenue?  
In spite of the i mportance of the topic,   the empirical literature  on  tax enforcement and 
compliance is limited at best, especially in  the context of developing countries where the required 
data are rarely available (among the few studies available,  see Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998), 
Mclaren (2003)).
4 Even in the context of developed countries, attempts to establish an empirical link 
between better administration and the extent of evasion have been less than satisfactory because of 
difficulties in getting data from actual tax -returns, and identification challenges due to un observed 
heterogeneity. This paper provides evidence on the effects of higher punishment (both monetary and 
non-monetary) on corporate tax revenue by analyzing a rich firm level data set from Ecuador, where 
imprisonment for 1 to 6 years was introduced in 2007 as a punishment for tax e vasion as the center 
piece of a new tax enforcement regime. 
There is a rich body of theoretical work on tax evasion in  the economics literature (see, 
Allingham and Sandmo  (1972), Srinivasan  (1973), Cowell  (1990), Das-Gupta and Mookherjee 
(1998), Mookherjee and Png (1994), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), among others).  The basic model 
as developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) adopts the `crime and punishment' framework that 
                                                 
2 For  recent discussions on the tax policy reform in developing and transition countries, see, for example, Gordon, R, ed. 
(2010), Gordon (2010), Whalley and Kononova (2010), Boadway and Sato (2009), Emran and Stiglitz (2005, 2007).  
3 Most of the governments in developing countries have turned to domestic borrowing to cover the revenue shor tfall. 
This has caused a dramatic increase in domestic debt in developing countries with the attendant consequences such as 
crowding out of private sector credit (see Emran and Farazi, 2009). 
4 In the context of developing countries, the empirical literature on corporate tax compliance is particularly scarce, even 
though corporate taxes have traditionally accounted for as much as one third of tax revenues (a much higher share than in 
developed countries) (Burgess and Stern (1993), and Avi-Yonah and Margalioth (2006)). 3 
 
grew  out  of  the  influential  work  of  Becker  (1964).  In  the  standard  model  with  risk  neutral 
preferences, the decision to evade taxes depends on the expected cost (probability of getting caught 
times the punishment) and benefit (savings from tax evasion).
5 A widely discussed implication of the 
Becker type models is that the optimal fine is m aximal, because while both monitoring and fines 
increase compliance, the first is more costly than the latter.
6 There is, however, a large literature that 
investigates why, in general, we do not observe maximal fines in the real world (for a survey of the 
literature, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000)). One important factor which is especially relevant for the 
developing countries is credit constraints, or more generally wealth constraints. The threat of a large 
fine has little bite if the tax payer does not have the money to pay the fine.
7  Another important issue 
in the context of developing countries is the weak legal capacity that may make it very costly for a 
tax authority to enforce the fines.    
Since the scope for monetary punishment is relatively limited in developing countries, non-
monetary punishment schemes including imprisonment for tax evasion assume added importance. If 
the threat of imprisonment is credible enough, it might affect the behavior of tax payer without 
requiring significant expansion  in prison space. A credible threat of imprisonment, not the actual 
imprisonment, is important for tax payers’ behavior.
8 Thus from a policy perspective, the threat of 
imprisonment seems to be an attra ctive instrument to improve taxpayer compliance in developing 
countries. However, note that the effects of higher punishment depend on the extent of corruption in 
tax administration. If most of the tax inspectors are corrupt, a higher punishment can mak e things 
worse for both the taxpayer and government (Stiglitz (2010), Emran and Stiglitz (2007)). Since the 
threat of imprisonment increases the bargaining power of tax inspector vis. a vis. the tax payer, the 
bribe amount will in general go up. But this may not increase government revenue as the inspector 
gets rich at the expense of both taxpayer and government. The effect of a higher punishment for tax 
evasion  on  government  revenue  is  thus  an  empirical  question.  However,  to  the  best  of  our 
knowledge, there is no empirical work in the current economics literature that attempts to isolate the 
effects  of  introducing  higher  punishment   on  the  behavior of  taxpayers and  tax  revenue  in  a 
developing country.
9 
                                                 
5 Crocker and Slemrod (2005) extend the standard model to study corporate tax compliance. They find that a sanction on 
the CFO has greater deterrent power than a sanction on the corporation itself, since the latter can be passed-on only 
imperfectly to the party making decisions. 
6 In theory, one can keep the expected cost for the taxpayer unchanged by increasing the fine arbitrarily while reducing 
the monitoring (auditing) close to zero. 
7 An important part of the problem is lack of information  on the ability to pay. For example, most of the firms in 
developing countries operate in the informal economy with little verifiable accounting data. This makes it especially 
difficult to use monetary punishment as a credible threat. 
8 In a repeated game model, one should not observe any imprisonment along the equilibrium path. 
9 Interestingly, most of the policy discussion on tax administration reform focuses on the incentives of the tax inspectors, 
and the possible collusion between the tax payer and tax  inspector (corruption). The literature, especially the empirical 
work, has largely ignored the role of higher punishment given a monitoring regime.   4 
 
This paper takes advantage of a rich firm level data set to analyze the effects of a reform to 
the tax code in Ecuador during 2007 that introduced higher punishment for tax evasion. Although the 
2007 reform imposed both monetary and non-monetary punishment, at its core was a highly costly 
and visible non-monetary punishment: the new legislation introduced reclusion from 1 to 6 years as 
a  punishment  for  non-compliance,  and  made  a  firm's  general  manager  (CFO)  and  anyone  else 
involved  in  the  tax  evasion  scheme  liable  for  a  criminal  offense.  Note  that  imprisonment  is  a 
fundamentally different form of punishment that entails potential social cost (loss of reputation in the 
society) for the family as a whole in addition to the cost to the evader himself/herself. Because of 
this special nature of imprisonment as a punishment for tax evasion, it stood out as the salient feature 
of the 2007 tax reform.
10 Furthermore, given that increased monetary punishment for tax evasion 
was in the form of higher interest rates on arrears and surcharges (20 percent), we are able to isolate 
the effect of non-monetary punishment (from that of monetary punishment) by including tax arrears 
as a control in our regressions.
11  
The  2007  reform  offers  us  an  excellent  opportunity  to  understand  the  impact  of  higher 
punishment as a tax enforcement instrument in a developing country for a number of reasons. First 
of all, the tax authority in Ecuador has a very good reputation, providing an environment in which 
the  threat  of  higher  punishment  is  likely  to  be  credible.
12  Second, by leaving most  of the  tax 
parameters unchanged,
13 the 2007 reform allows us to isolate the effects of one particular component 
of the reform (i.e. punishment) given a tax rate structure. Indeed, a major difficulty in estimating the 
effects of  higher punishment on tax evasion is that tax reforms are usually omnibus reform that 
implements an  array of changes simultaneously such as c hanges in types of taxes (for example, 
introduction of VAT),  rates (changes in tariff and VAT rates  are common), and enforcement 
mechanisms (for example, hiring of new tax inspectors, higher wages for tax inspectors and higher 
punishment for corruption by tax officials). The corporate tax rates  were not affected by the 2007 
reform, and there is no evidence that monitoring and enforcement improved in any significant way. 
We study the effects of higher punishment on corporate tax compliance both at the intensive 
and extensive margins. For the intensive margin, we use the subset of firms that belongs to the tax-
net for consecutive years, and for the extensive margin, we focus on the entry into and exit from the 
tax net using the universe of firms across different years. Moreover, by combining the difference-in-
difference (DD) approach with the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (DFL) decomposition  method, we 
                                                 
10 Most of the discussion in the media and among general people focused on this aspect of the reform. 
11 This is done under robustness checks in section 5.5. 
12 The tax administration in Ecuador started operations as an independent agency in 1997. A ccording to Mann (2004), 
this new entity achieved significant improvements in tax collection because  “since inception the SRI has had only one 
Director who is well known for her honesty and competence”. Similarly, according to World Bank (2003), “the creation 
of the Internal Revenue Service (SRI in its Spanish acronym) as an independent entity and its strengthening in the late 
nineties brought about a significant recovery in non-oil tax revenue.” 
13Most tax parameters remained unchanged, not only in 2007, but throughout the entire duration of our dataset (2003-07) 5 
 
are able to estimate the heterogeneous effects of the reform across the distribution of firms, without 
imposing any arbitrary functional form.
14 Although most of the empirical literature on tax reform 
deals with the mean (i.e., the average) effects, the mean effects might mask important heterogeneity 
across different firms. Moreover, the possibility of heterogeneous effects has implications for both 
revenue and equity effects of a tax reform.  
There are many plausible theoretical reasons to expect the effects of a higher punishment on 
firms to be heterogeneous. For example, small firms may respond differently because audit resources 
are usually not concentrated on the lower tail of the firm distribution. Also, new startup firms, that 
are usually smaller in size, are likely to be significantly less risk averse and thus may discount the 
cost of higher punishment. In contrast, firms in the middle and top of the distribution may react more 
strongly to changes in punishment because they are visible to tax inspectors and they are subject to 
more intense monitoring. Moreover, it may only be cost-effective for the tax authority to punish 
large firms, for which the revenues that are recovered exceed the costs of taking the firm to court.  
To estimate the effect of the higher punishment, we use difference-in-difference (DD) and 
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approaches, exploiting the fact that we have data on a 
number of years before the reform was implemented (2003-2006). The main identification challenge 
in our application is that the effects of the 2007 reform on revenue may be confounded by other 
secular  factors  such  as  sustained  economic  growth  and  small  but  steady  improvements  in  tax 
administration.
15 The increase in tax revenue between 2006 and 2007 thus cannot be attributed solely 
to the increased punishment for tax evasion even though there was no change in the  corporate tax 
rates and no significant improvements in the enforcement regime, especially as it relates to firms .  
We thus need to construct the counterfactual trend in revenue growth that would have been observed 
in the absence of the 2007 reform. The availability of data for four years before the reform allows us 
to  understand  the  underlying  trend  with  a  measure  of  confidence,  and  also  to  construct  the 
counterfactual trend in a variety of ways. For example, we calculate alternative trend lines across the 
distribution of firms using data from different pairs of consecutive years, and then take the upper 
envelope of the different trends as a conservative estimate of the counterfactual trend in corporate 
tax revenue in the absence of the reform. An alternative is to use the average of the different trends 
                                                 
14 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper in the literature to combine difference-in-difference with the DFL 
method to estimate heterogeneous effects of tax policy on firms. 
15 Note that in most of the available studies in economics that use difference -in-difference method, data consists of only 
one period before the treatment (usually baseline surveys in evaluation studies), which makes it difficult to estimate the 
underlying trend in the absence of intervention, and one cannot test the validity of the “parallel trend” assumption.  The 
fact that we have data for four periods before the “intervention” (i.e., 2007 reform) makes it easier for us to estimate the 
counterfactual trend. One might argue that compared to a standard difference in difference set-up our data set suffers 
from the fact that we do not have a `control group’ in the same period of time. However, observe that most of the 
objections to the validity of difference-in-difference strategy emanates from the fact that the control group may not be a 
good representation of the treatment group in the counterfactual state. In our case, the control group is exactly the same 
firms, but observed in a different time period.   6 
 
as an estimate of the counterfactual trend. The average may represent the counterfactual trend more 
faithfully if the year-to-year changes in corporate income tax revenue are affected significantly by 
transitory shocks. To address the possibility that the underlying trend is not linear, and may be a 
convex  function  of  time  (i.e.,  the  year-to-year  revenue  changes  are  increasing  over  time  in  the 
absence of the reform), we implement a triple difference (DDD) approach.   
In the context of our application, where we rely on variations over time for estimating the 
revenue  effect  of  the  reform,  the  estimates  might  be  misleading  if  the  year  of  the  reform  was 
exceptional in terms of economic performance. For example, if the economy experienced a strong 
positive productivity shock; then, the corporate tax revenue might be driven by firms’ higher growth 
and sales revenue rather than by the threat of imprisonment. However, 2007 was not above the trend 
in terms of economic performance, the growth rate in GDP was 3.6% and in manufacturing value 
added was 3.8% in 2007 compared to 4.8% (GDP) and 4.7% (manufacturing value added) for the 
period 2003-2006.
16 Thus an increase in tax revenue between 2006 and  2007 is not likely to be 
driven by common positive shocks to growth such as productivity or price shocks.
17 As an additional 
layer of caution, we control for the sales revenue of firms in the regressions.
18 
  At the  intensive margin, results suggest that there was a large and positive  `mean effect’ 
(about 10 percent) of increased punishment on tax revenue. In other words, for firms that were 
already in the tax net before the reform, tax payments went up by about 10 percent on average. 
However, the effects were heterogeneous across the tax distribution. For example, tax revenues did 
not increase at the 40
th quantile, but they increased by 14 percent at the 90
th quantile (based on the 
DD  specification).  Thus,  focusing  exclusively  on  the  mean  estimates  can  mask  important 
heterogeneity  in  the  impact  of  tax  reforms.  At  the  extensive  margin,  results  suggest  that  the 
probability of entry into the tax-net increased due to higher punishment in 2007 as compared to prior 
years (2003-06). However, most of the firms that entered the tax net in 2007 actually claimed zero 
taxes, and consequently they did not contribute to increasing the government’s tax revenue. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details about 
Ecuador’s Tax Administration and the 2007 reform. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, we 
present  the  empirical  strategy  to  measure  the  mean  impact  of  the  2007  reform  at  the  intensive 
margin. Section 5 measures the impact at several points of the tax distribution. In Section 6, we 
discuss effects of the reform at the extensive margin. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                 
16 However, non-oil GDP growth performance was better.  
17 One important price shock especially for government revenue in Ecuador is oil price. To make sure that our results are 
not driven by the oil revenue, we exclude the firms in the oil sector. 
18 We would expect a firm to report higher sales when declaring higher tax liabilities as a response to higher punishment. 
This implies that by controlling for the sales revenue, we might be underestimating the effects of punishment. It is 
interesting that we still find substantial effects of higher punishment on corporate income tax revenue. 7 
 
2. Taxation in Ecuador 
In this section, we provide some institutional details about Ecuador, its Tax Administration 
(SRI) and, most importantly, the 2007 Tax Reform.  
 
2.1. General background 
Ecuador is a developing country in South America. In 2006, its per capita GDP was close to 
US$ 3,200 –lower than most of the other countries in this continent except Bolivia and Paraguay. 
Ecuador’s economy relies heavily on the oil industry. Oil exports accounted for about 55 percent of 
its total exports and approximately 25 percent of the Central Government revenue came from oil-
related royalties in 2006. Agriculture is the second most important sector. 
In Ecuador, all firms are taxed 25% of their profits.
19  Reinvested profits are taxed at a rate of 
15% (Deloitte 2010). Moreover, all corporations are required to distribute 15% of pre-tax profits 
among their employees.  Although these tax obligations may seem hi gh, the typical corporate tax 
burden in Ecuador is lower than in other countries in the region. The tax base is defined as the sum 
of ordinary and extraordinary revenues subject to tax, less  production costs and other discounts and 
deductions.
20 Profits are taxed equally regardless of whether they are retained or distributed. Special 
provision laws may allow for additional tax breaks.
21  
The fiscal year in Ecuador coincides with the calendar year (ending   December  31).  All 
corporations must file an annual profit tax return at the end of the tax year –between February 1
st and 
May 10
th– according to a deadline that varies with the corporation’s tax registration number. Each 
corporation  assesses  its  own  profit  tax,  but  tax  authority  usually  revises  those  assessments  on 
subsequent inspections within specified time limits (Deloitte 2010). Virtually all revenue received by 
corporations is subject to income tax withholding (Deloitte 2010).
22 The tax withheld is usually an 
advance payment of the recipient’s profit-tax and may be used to offset the total annual tax due. The 
SRI has the power to adjust withholding rates without approval of the legislature.  
The  SRI  classifies  corporations  into  different  groups,  which  may  face  higher  levels  of 
monitoring. The most relevant is the Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU). LTU taxpayers –locally known as 
                                                 
19Corporate  taxes  in  Ecuador  fit  the  economic  definition  of  a  “profit”  tax,  rather  than  an  “income”  tax,  because 
production costs are deductible. 
20Companies in certain sectors such as petroleum, construction,  urban development, and real estate dealings, may 
compute taxable income in accordance with special rules (Deloitte 2010).  
21For instance, there is a Hydrocarbons Law specific for the oil sector;  Tourism and Mining Laws provide their own set 
of tax breaks; and Regional-development Laws offer tax incentives for investments in certain provinces (EIU, 2006).  
22The withholding system is a mechanism where most companies (those that are designated by the SRI to be withholding 
agents) are required to deduct and withhold a fixed percentage of the payments they make to other firms. We refer to this 
fixed percentage as the withholding rate. This deduction takes place only if the payment is taxable income for those who 
receive it. Every month, withholding agents must report and transfer all withholdings to the tax authority. Firms can 
deduct their withheld funds from their tax liability. 8 
 
“special taxpayers”– are the firms of greatest economic importance (usually measured by their sales 
and employment levels) within each sub-region in the country.  
 
2.2. The 2007 Tax Reform 
  During  the  last  decade,  taxation  in  Ecuador  has  faced  a  number  of  profound  changes. 
Taxation  in  Ecuador  may  be  classified  into  three  periods:  (a)  a  period  of  policy  instability 
accompanied by deep administrative reform between 1997 and 2003; (b) a period of relative status-
quo  –lack  of  structural  tax  reform  accompanied  by  a  consolidation  of  earlier  administrative 
improvements– between 2003 and 2006; and (c) a major tax reform in 2007.  To avoid cluttering the 
text, in this section we focus on the 2007 reform (details about earlier reforms can be requested from 
the authors). 
In 2007, reducing tax evasion and improving tax collection became a primary objective of a 
new  presidential  administration.  At  the  end  of  December  2007,  the  Ecuadorian  constitutional 
assembly passed a major tax reform bill, known as “Reform for Tax Equity”. Although the 2007 Tax 
Reform introduced a variety of changes affecting several types of taxpayers (i.e. individuals and 
corporations), it left most of the tax parameters unchanged in so  far as firms are concerned. A 
summary of the tax changes introduced in 2007 which are relevant for corporations is presented in 
Table A1.  
The  most  notable  aspect  of  the  2007  tax  reform  is  the  introduction  of  more  rigorous 
sanctions.
23  Most importantly,  minor ordinary reclusion from 1 to 6 years   was introduced as a 
punishment for tax evasion . Moreover, legal actions can no longer be extinguished through the 
payment of tax liabilities as occurred prior to 2007. In addition, while in the past only a company’s 
legal representative or accountant were responsible for tax-crimes, now this responsibility extends to 
anyone in the company who may have been part of a tax evasion scheme, and in particular the CFO. 
Also, the new legislation increased fines and surcharges charged to firms that fail to pay their tax 
obligations.
24  Another change in the tax regime that can potentially confound our estimates of the 
effects of higher punishment is the increases in the withholding rates in 2007 implemented through a 
SRI decree.  Fortunately, we have data on both tax arrears and taxes withheld by third parties; and 
we include them as additional covariates as part of the robustness checks. 
   
                                                 
23 Besides tougher sanctions, the 2007 tax reform introduced a few other changes, most of which, however, affect only 
multinational corporations which are not part of our sample. For example, multinationals are impeded from transferring 
profit to related parties located in tax-heavens. 
24 The interest rate for tax arrears increased from 1.1 to 1.5 times the reference rate (the 90 -day active referential interest 
rate of the Central Bank), and a surcharge of 20% of the principal must now  be paid for non-declared income that is 
discovered by the SRI through tax assessments. Prior to the reform, taxpayers were charged only the additional tax 
assessed plus interest. 9 
 
The timing of the reform is also fortuitous for our empirical analysis. The new measures 
came into effect in January 2008; however, given that tax-returns for a given year are filed in April 
of the following year, some parts of the new legislation –in particular more severe sanctions for tax 
evasion– effectively apply to the 2007 tax-year. Interestingly, given that the reform was passed at the 
end of the tax year, firms could respond to higher punishment by adjusting how they fill-out their tax 
returns, but they were unable to change their actual behavior.
25  
On the administrative front,  although the leadership of the SRI changed in 2007,  the SRI 
continued with prior efforts to modernize tax administration. There is, however, no evidence that the 
enforcement and monitoring regime changed in any significant way in 2007. This is important for 
our analysis because if enforcement and monitoring become significantly more efficient in 2007, 
then it will be difficult to isolate the effects of higher punishment. Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
that the audit risk increased in 2007 for most of the firms. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that audit risk 
increased for most  of the  taxpayers given the tight resource constraints of the SRI. Moreover, 
according to the available SRI data, the number of audits (of certain types) decreased in the Northern 
Tax Office, where most firms are located. Although the enforcement and monitoring regime did not 
change  in any significant way   in 2007,  the average monitoring  intensity still  can change with 
changes  in  the number  of  firms  selected into   the  LTU  where  firms  are  subject  to  enhanced 
monitoring. The number of firms that are  selected into LTU varies substantially from year to year  
without any clear trend.  For example, the number of new LTU firms was 818 in 2007, 228 in 2006, 
574 in 2005, 97 in 2002, and 840 in 1999. To all ay any concerns that at least part of the revenue 
response observed in 2007 may be due to the increase in the number of LTU firms, we report results 
using a sample that excludes all of the LTU firms. It is reassuring that we find that the main results 
of the paper are robust to such changes in the sample of firms.  
Finally, in 2007, the SRI also exercised its power to decree a hike in  the withholding rates.  
In July 2007 there was a hike in withholding rates for  most economic sectors (from 1 to 2 percent), 
excluding the transport sector. To check if the estimated revenue increases in 2007 can be due to 
changes in withholding rates, we report results as part of robustness checks that control for the total 
withholding amount in the rgressions (please see section 5.5). 
 
3. Data Description  
The data used in this paper were obtained from SRI administrative records. The database 
                                                 
25 This may result in underestimating the overall impact of the 2007 reform, because some improvements in compliance 
require changes in actual behavior. Such underestimation could be mitigated if firms expected an increase in punishment 
at the beginning of the tax year. However, while the possibility of introducing reclusion as a punishment for tax evasion 
was mentioned by the tax authority early in 2007; the text of the reform was subject to numerous and significant changes 
throughout the year, and it was not clear whether the reform would actually be approved until December 2007.  10 
 
contains information on every line-item of the universe of profit tax returns filed by public and 
private  corporations  in  Ecuador. Regardless  of  profitability,  all corporations  are required to  file 
profit taxes using Tax-Form 101, which contains information on the firm’s balance sheet and income 
statement.
26 The requirement that  all corporations file a tax return is not inconsequential  for our 
analysis, as it leads to censoring in corporate profit taxes (roughly 30% of firms claim zero taxes in 
any given year).  
For the empirical analysis at the intensive margin, we focus on the sample of firms that file a 
tax return in consecutive periods, and for the extensive margin, the focus is on  the probability of 
entering/exiting the tax net. In both cases, we exclude from the sample the firms that belong to the 
public sector or that operate in the oil industry because they are subject to special taxation rules. All 
nominal variables are deflated, to allow for meaningful comparisons across years , using the CPI 
from the Ecuadorian Central Bank.
27 However, some further adjustments were made to the data 
sample  used  to study the intensive margin .
28  Specifically,  the sample for the intensive margin 
focuses exclusively on firms that were created in 2003 or earlier, in order to control for the impact of 
firm creation and to control for tax policies that encourage firm closure and reorganization as new 
ventures.
29 The resulting  number of observations is approximately 24,000 firms per year  (at the 
intensive margin).  
Table A2 presents summary statistics by year for the main variable of interest –corporate tax 
revenue– both in levels and logarithms. We notice that there is an underlying positive trend from 
year t to year (t+1) over the span of the pre-reform period (2003-2006), suggesting that it is not 
unusual to observe an increase in average corporate tax revenue in Ecuador. However, we also 
notice that while mean reported profit taxes between 2003 and 2006 increased at a similar annual 
rate; profit taxes increased notably more during 2007.
30 Indeed, it is not surprising t hat reported 
taxes between 2003 and 2006 do not deviate much from the trend  as no major tax reforms were 
introduced during this period.  
                                                 
26 This form can be requested from the authors. 
27 Applying the same deflator to all regions in Ecuador is appropriate as most corporations are concentrated in the two 
major provinces –Guayas and Pichincha. Results are similar when using other price measures such as the wholesale price 
index. 
28 This sample includes only firms that file a tax return in consecutive years.  We also excluded from  this sample 
observations with inconsistencies (i.e. negative revenues, etc.) and outliers. 
29 The pattern of the results is similar when including in the data sample firms created after 2003, and/or firms that fail to 
file a tax return in consecutive-years.  
30 To understand the trend in corporate taxes, we estimated the following model: 
t i t t i u I trend Y ,
(0.37) (0.16) (0.61)
, ) 2007 ( 1.58 1.29   6.29     (robust SE in parenthesis).  
The model suggests, that while that tax revenue generally increase by $1,200 year-on-year, in 2007 tax revenue increased 
by $1,500 above the trend. The model also suggests that an unusually large increase in corporate tax revenue between 
2006 and 2007 cannot be explained by unusually low taxes in 2006.  11 
 
Table A3 presents summary statistics for firms’ observable characteristics. The choice of 
these variables is motivated by a close reading of the Ecuadorian tax law, and also the literature on 
corporate tax compliance and effective tax rates (ETRs).
31 The variables include revenue and total 
assets as measures of the size of the firm and its performance. According to prior empirical evidence, 
the effect of these variables on tax compliance of a firm is, however, not unambiguous (Rice, 1992; 
Hanlon and Slemrod, 2005; Spooner, 1986; Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998). Other covariates include 
fixed to total assets, leverage, and purchases (costs). These variables should reduce tax payments due 
to the deductibility of capital investments, interest payments, and costs (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Porcano, 1986; Stickney and McGee, 1982).  In the robustness checks sub-section (section 5.5), we 
include additional covariates that are specific to our application. W e control for withholdings to 
isolate the impact of  hikes in withholding rates (from 1 to 2 percent of income) occurring in mid-
2007;  and  we  include  tax  arrears  in  order  to  try  to  isolate  the  prison  effect  (non -monetary 
punishment) from increases in the interest rate on tax arrears (monetary punishment). 
The  inclusion  of  sales  and  costs  as  covariates  deserve  some  additional  explanation. 
Controlling for these variables helps to account for possible demand shifts due to  macroeconomic 
conditions (such as GDP and exports growth), and it also helps to account for factors affecting firms’ 
costs such as productivity shocks and changes in imported intermediate input costs.  Without any 
controls for the exogenous changes in the demand or cost conditions, the estimated response in profit 
taxes in 2007 is likely to capture the resulting changes in the true profitability of the firms, rather 
than the exclusive effect of the higher punishment.  However, note that we would expect a firm to 
report higher sales and/or lower costs when it declares higher tax liability as a response to higher 
punishment. Thus, by controlling for sales and costs, we are potentially underestimating the impact 
of punishment on compliance. Interestingly, however, we find that the 2007 reform has a positive 
revenue impact even when sales and costs are held constant. This may reflect the fact that firms in 
Ecuador  may  misreport  not  only  profits,  but  also  other  line  items  in  their  tax  returns  such  as 
exemptions.
32  If we estimate the revenue response without controlling for a firm’s sales and costs, 
the estimated effects of 2007 reform are larger. These estimates can be viewed as upper bounds on 
the positive tax response to higher punishment. We do not report these results for the sake of brevity, 
and they are available from the authors.   
   
                                                 
31 As pointed out by Hanlon and Slemrod (2005), to the extent that low effective tax rates (ETRs), defined as total tax 
expense divided by pre-tax earnings, are a proxy for aggressive tax positions, variables that explain differences in ETRs 
may help explain other measures of tax non-compliance as well.  
32 Klepper and Nagin (1989) find that taxpayer misreport different line -items, according to opportunities for evasion. 
Moreover, large firms usually have sophisticated accounting departments that allow them to engage in complex tax 
avoidance schemes.  12 
 
4. Effects of 2007 Reform: Intensive Margin 
4.1. Empirical Strategy  
  In the introduction, we discussed a host of issues that arise in estimating the effects of higher 
punishment for tax evasion with panel data. We also underscored some important advantages of the 
2007 reform in Ecuador and the panel data set used in this paper that has multiple years of data 
before the 2007 reform. The central issue in identifying the effects of higher punishment using panel 
data is how to reliably estimate the underlying trend in reported corporate profit taxes. We use 
difference-in-difference  (DD) and difference-in-difference-indifference (DDD) estimators  for this 
purpose. The richness of the panel data also allows us to check the validity of the DD and DDD 
estimates using a set of placebo DD and DDD estimates.     
 
Difference in the Distribution of Corporate Income Taxes (D) 
A large rightward shift in the distribution of corporate profit taxes between 2006 and 2007 
would  provide  some  prima  facie  evidence  suggesting  that  higher  punishment  improved  tax 
compliance. However, as shown in Table A2, mean corporate profit taxes are increasing over time, 
suggesting that the entire tax distribution (or most of it) may be shifting to the right. Therefore, the 
difference in corporate profit taxes between 2006 and 2007 would overestimate the effect of higher 
punishment.  
The upward trend in corporate profit taxes may be driven by macroeconomic factors such as 
economic growth. Firms may have experienced higher profit margins due to higher local or export 
demand or due to lower costs (positive productivity shocks). Moreover, in the specific context of 
Ecuador, slow but steady improvements in tax administration that were initiated in 1997 with the 




A widely used approach to eliminate the bias in the estimate from the single difference is to 
use  a  difference-in-difference  (henceforth  DD)  that  yields  the  appropriate  estimate  under  the 
assumption that the underlying trends are linear and parallel. The DD estimator compares taxes 
reported in the most recent pre-reform and post-reform  years (treatment), to another set of pre-
                                                 
33 The recent literature has highlighted the potential role of social and moral costs of non-compliance as an important 
element in understanding the observed behavior of tax payers. Many researchers have invoked these  more cultural 
factors  to  reconcile  the  fact  that  the  compliance  level  is  too  high  given  the  monitoring  intensity  and  severity  of 
punishment, and Allingham-Sandmo model seems to grossly underestimate the expected compliance. However, note that 
such cultural  norms do not change in the  span of a few  years, and thus cannot be important in understanding the 
differences in revenue performance in 2007 relative to the immediate previous years.  In an interesting recent paper Saez 
et al (forthcoming) show that the compliance can be explained in terms of third party enforcement  without taking 
recourse to cultural factors.  13 
 
reform  years  (control).
34 The change in reported taxe s for the control gro up is a counterfactual 
measure of the tax increase that would have occurred in the absence of the reform.  
DD estimates of the effect of higher punishment would be unbiased if the factors underlying 
the trend in corporate profit taxes would change at a constant rate over time (in the absence of the 
reform). It is unlikely, however, that all  factors underlying the trend would normally change  at a 
constant rate. Thus, DD estimates may be improved upon by explicitly controlling for those f irm 
characteristics for which data is available.  
 
Difference –in-difference-in-difference (DDD) 
   In the context for our application, the DD identifying assumption requires that the year-to-
year change in omitted variables is the same for any adjacent pair of time periods.
35 Throughout the 
span of our dataset most of the relevant tax policy parameters have remained unchanged, making the 
identification assumption more plausible. However, there may be some other (unobservable) factors 
that may be affecting the year-on-year shifts in reported taxes differently in different periods. 
For instance, the Ecuadorian tax authority has been making continuous improvements in tax 
administration; yet it is unlikely that such tax improvements are constan t year-on-year. If there is 
learning by doing, the efficiency gains from such improvements may be convex  (the year-on-year 
tax shift may be larger in more recent years). Such an upward trend (in tax shifts) would result in DD 
estimates for the effect  of higher punishment  that are biased upward, as we would  (incorrectly) 
attribute to the  higher punishment some of the  tax increase that resulted from  other factors. We 
eliminate this bias by constructing a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator (DDD).  
 
4.2. Mean Effects: Did Higher Punishment Increase Average Corporate Tax 
Revenues?  
Given that most of the extant tax literature focuses on the mean effects of tax reform; before 
presenting the results for different quantiles of the tax distribution, it may be useful to discuss OLS 
estimates. We start by considering the mean difference (D) in corporate profit taxes between 2006 
and  2007.  We  estimate  the  parameter  of  interest, ] , | [ ] , | [ 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E i
D    ,  based  on  the 
                                                 
34 As noted before, the firms in the control group in our analysis are exactly the same firms in the treatment group, only 
observed in a different time period (close approximation to a parallel world!).  
35 The DD identifying assumption would be satisfied if the tax shift between 2006 and 2007 would have been parallel  to 
the tax shift for the control group in the absence of the reform (i.e. the trend in reported taxes was linear across the years, 
and would have remained unchanged in the absence of the reform).  Moreover, in the context of our empirical strategy, 
where we rely on variations over time for estimating the revenue effect of the reform, identification assumptions also 
require that 2007 was not an exceptional year in ways that could have affected corporate tax revenue. While the number 
of factors that could have some effect on tax revenue is large; the number of factors that could increase tax payments by 
close to 30% (as shown in Table B1) is more limited. Thus, in our empirical application we pay particular attention to 
reliably controlling for major tax determinants (i.e. sales, costs, assets, amongst other variables).   14 
 
following specification:                           
t i t i i
D
t i u X R Y , , 0 ,          (1) 
Where  t i Y ,  is the level of profit taxes of firm i in period t;  i R  is a dummy that equals one for the year 
of the reform (2007) and equals zero otherwise (2006).  
We also estimate the mean impact of increased punishment using a diff-in-diff estimator 
(DD).  The  parameter  of  interest,      ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ 05 06 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E i
DD      ,  is 
estimated based on the following specification
36:   
t i t i i
DD
t i u X R Y , , 0 ,                   (2) 
Where  1 , , ,     t i t i t i Y Y Y  are first-differences of the dependant variable, and  1 , , ,     t i t i t i x x x  are 
first-differences of the covariates;  i R  equals one for the reform period 2006-07 and zero for the 
control period 2005-06;  and 
DD   is an average treatment effect on the treated where all treated 
firms are weighted equally.
37  This specification utilizes firm fixed effects to sweep off all the time 
invariant factors that might affect a firm’s profits and its reported tax liability. 
   Finally, we estimate the effect of increased punishment using a diff-in-diff-in-diff (DDD) 
estimator. The parameter of interest is,            ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ 05 06 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E
DDD   
      ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ 04 05 05 06 t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E    , which is obtained from estimating the 
following specification: 




t i u X R R Y , , 0 ,              (3) 
Where 
i p R is a binary indicator that takes on a value of one for 2004-2005 and zero otherwise, and  
i R  was defined above. Thus the coefficients of the dummies  i R  and 
i p R  provide the estimated 
effect of revenue response in 2006-2007 and 2004-2005 respectively, relative to 2005-2006 (the 
omitted  category).  Since  revenue  increases  monotonically  from  2004-2007,  we  would  expect 
DD  ˆ >0,  but 
DD
P  ˆ <0.   Here,  the  possible  bias  from  differences in  the  pre-reform  trends  for  the 
treatment  and  control  groups  is  addressed  by  computing  two  DD  estimators  simultaneously. 
Specifically, 
DD  ˆ  would be an unbiased estimator of the effect of increased punishment if not for 
factors such as increased tax administration efficiency over time that may not be constant.  The 
parameter 
DD
P  ˆ   is  an  estimate  of  this potential  bias.  The  estimate  of  most  interest  is  therefore, 
DD
P
DD DDD    ˆ ˆ ˆ   , a difference-indifference-in-difference estimator.   
                                                 
36 The DD estimator measures the increase in tax revenue over time for the treatment minus the increase in tax revenue 
over time for the control group.  
37 In essence, equation (2) consists of a pooled regression of stacked differenced observations, where control variables 




The estimation results for the above specifications are shown in Panel A of Table B1. In all 
models, the dependant variable is the level of corporate profit taxes and covariates include income, 
assets,  costs,  ratio  of  fixed  to  total  assets,  and  leverage.
38  We find that tax revenues increased 
between US$ 1,600 and US$ 1,800 (based on the D, DD and DDD). Thus, there was roughly a 10 
percent tax  revenue increase based on the different  specifications.
39 We test the validity of our 
approach by estimating similar models to the ones described above (D, DD, and DDD),  but using a 
pair of pre-reform years as a placebo treatment group (2005-2006).  As expected due to the upward 
trend  in  m ean  corporate  profit  taxes,  D  estimates  are  statistically  significant  for  the  placebo 
treatment group (although the magnitude is smaller). However, while the DD and DDD effects of 
increased punishment were statistically significant for the actual treatment group (2006-07); they are 
not statistically significant for the placebo treatment group (2005-06).
40  
It is also interesting to analyze whether different groups of firms respond differently to 
changes in punishment. To explore this possibility, we estimate  the mean impact of the reform for 
the sub-sample of firms that pay positive taxes in consecutive years. As shown in Panel B of Table 
B1, the coefficient estimates for the sub-sample are much larger than the estimates obtained earlier 
for the full-sample (ranging from $US 2,100 for the D model to $US 2,200 for the DDD). Given that 
firms  paying  positive taxes on consecutive  years are likely to be at the   right tail of the  tax 
distribution,  we would expect  higher punishment to have heterogeneous impacts  along the tax 
distribution.   
Mean estimates are instructive; however, they have some important limitations. First of all, 
estimates for the full-sample (including firms filing zero tax returns) may be biased due to censoring 
(almost 30% of the firms report z ero taxes).
41 Secondly, there is large variability in the data; and 
mean estimates are more adversely affected by outliers than median (or quantile) estimates. Also, the 
OLS estimates presented above impose constant marginal effect s  across time for all covariates; 
which may not be a valid assumption. More importantly, the mean estimates may hide important 
heterogeneity throughout the tax distribution. As a result, in the next section we use methods that 
impose little parametric assumptions, and allow us to obtain  reliable estimates of the impact of 
increased punishment at different points of the distribution, even when censored observations are 
                                                 
38 Additional estimations, which are available from the authors, show that results are robust to a number of changes in 
the model specification, such as measuring some of the covariates in logs, etc.  
39 Calculated as  06 / ˆ Y
D  . 
40 The placebo control is (2003-2004) and the omitted category (2004-2005) for the DDD estimates. 
41 While non-linear models could be used to  account for the censoring, strong functional form assumptions about the 




5. Quantile Analysis (Intensive Margin) 
We begin this section with a descriptive analysis. Table B2 summarizes the tax distribution 
for  2006,  the  distribution  for  2007,  and  the  difference  between  the  two  (both  in  levels  and  in 
logarithms). We observe a 33 percent increase in the mean level of corporate profit taxes between 
2006 and 2007. However, the mean increase hides different levels of improvement along the tax 
distribution. Taxes decreased by 11 percent at the 30
th quantile, but they increased by 31 percent for 
the  99
th  quantile.  Could  the  large  rightward  shift  at  higher  quantiles  of  the  tax  distribution  be 
explained by firm characteristics? As shown at the bottom of Table B3, the percentage change in 
covariates  is  much  smaller  than  that  of  profit  taxes,  suggesting  that  it  is  unlikely  that  firm’s 
economic conditions played a major role
42. We now turn to a more formal analysis. 
 
5.2. Difference in the Tax Distribution (DFL)   
The shift in the distribution of corporate income profit taxes between 2006 and 2007, after 
controlling for firms’ observable characteristics,  provides prima facie evidence of the impact of 
higher punishment on tax revenue. How much of the rightward shift in the tax distribution between 
2006 and 2007 remains “unexplained” after netting out the effect of firms’ economic characteristics?  
To answer this question, we rely on a decomposition method developed first by DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (1996) (DFL), and further extended by Lemieux (2002), and Leibbrandt, Levinshon and 
McCrary (2009).
43  This “unexplained” shift across different pairs of consecutive years can be used 
to  provide estimates  of the effects  of the higher punishment on tax payments  across the whole 
distribution of firms  within  the difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-difference 
framework. 
Figure C1 shows the cumulative density function of log profit taxes for 2006 and 2007. We 
would like to construct a counterfactual –how the distribution of log profit taxes in 2006 would look 
like if the individual firm characteristics (i.e. real-income, assets, financial ratios, etc.) were the same 
as in 2007. The counterfactual distribution is estimated by re-weighting the pre-reform sample to 
mimic  the  distributions  of  firms’  attributes  as  they  were  after  the  reform.  In  the  figure,  the 
counterfactual distribution is shown between the actual distributions for 2006 and 2007.  
                                                 
42Only the percentage change in withholdings is large enough to potentially explain a significant fraction of the shift in 
tax revenues. Withholdings are included as an additional covariate for estimations in the robustness checks sub-section 
(under section 5.5). 
43Properties of estimators similar to the ones used in this paper are shown in Fir po (2007) and  Abadie (2003).  The 
estimation of counterfactual distributions using semi-parametric methods has received a significant amount of attention 
in the recent literature. In particular, a method using quantile regressions and simulations by Machado  and Mata (2005) 
has been widely applied to analyze counterfactual distributions of wages (Albrecht et  al. 2003), income (Nguyen et al. 
2007), and homeownership rates (Carrillo and Yezer 2009), among others.  17 
 
The counterfactual distribution decomposes the overall difference in corporate profit taxes 
between 2006 and 2007 into a part that is “explained” by firm characteristics, and a part that remains 
“unexplained” (and may be partly attributed to the 2007 Reform). The decomposition is summarized 
as follows: 
                                          
Explained lained Un
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      (4) 
Where    i t Y Q |   is the 
th   quantile of the distribution of taxes in year i; and    i
j i t Y Q |

  is the 
th   
quantile of the distribution of taxes in year i, if firm attributes where identical to those in year j 
(counterfactual distribution). Our preliminary estimator of the impact of higher punishment on tax 
revenue (D-DFL) is given by the “unexplained” shift from the DFL decomposition of profit taxes 
between 2006 and 2007. 
 
5.3. Difference-in-Differences combined with DFL (DD-DFL)   
A single DFL decomposition of the tax shift between 2006 and 2007 as calculated earlier –
although  it  controls  for  the  effect  of  firms’  observable  characteristics–  would  overestimate  the 
impact of higher punishment due to omitted variables driving an upward trend in tax payments. We 
obtain more reliable estimates by constructing a difference-in-difference (DD) estimator that is based 
on  the  DFL  methodology  (called  DD-DFL  estimator).  The  DD-DFL  estimator  compares  taxes 
reported in the most recent pre-reform and post-reform  years (treatment), to another set of pre-
reform  years (control).  In our application, the time-difference in corporate income taxes for the 
treatment period is calculated as the “unexplained” shift from a DFL decomposition of profit taxes 
between 2006 and 2007. Similarly, the time-difference in corporate income taxes for the control 
period is calculated as the “unexplained” shift from a DFL decomposition of profit taxes between 
2005 and 2006.
44 The resulting DD parameter has the following form:  
                               
Control Treatment







7                   (5) 
Where 
DFL DD
  ˆ  is the DD-DFL estimator for the impact of the reform at quantile ; and other 
notation is the same as before. 
   
5.4. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference combined with DFL (DDD-DFL)   
As previously discussed, it is possible that the trend in corporate profit taxes may be convex. 
Thus, another parameter of interest is the following:   
                                                 
44An alternative would be to reweight the distribution in each year to have the same observable characteristics as the 
distribution in 2007. Results for this approach are similar, and are available from the authors upon request. 18 
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Where  
DFL DDD
  ˆ  is a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator (DDD-DFL) of the impact of 
the reform for quantile  .  
   
5.5. Results   
The quantile effects of increased punishment on tax revenue using the three models discussed 
above (D-DFL, DD-DFL, and DDD-DFL) are shown in Panel A of Table B3. For our preferred 
model, which combines difference-in-difference-in-difference with DFL (DDD-DFL), we find that 
the impact  of higher  punishment  is  heterogeneous.  Firms  at  the 90
th quantile experienced  a tax 
increase of approximately US$ 1,970 (larger than the mean effect of US$1,650). However, below the 
70
th quantile firms did not increase their tax payments. Similar patterns emerge from the D-DFL and 
DD-DFL specifications. 
We test the validity of our approach by estimating similar models to the ones described 
above, but using a pair of pre-reform years as a placebo treatment group. Results are shown in Panel 
B of Table B3. As expected due to the upward trend in mean reported taxes, D-DFL estimates for the 
placebo  are  statistically  significant;  however,  DDD-DFL  estimates  are  generally  small  and  not 
statistically significant.
45 We are thus confident that the estimated effects in Panel A of  Table B3 
provide reliable estimates of the effects of the higher punishment instituted in 2007.  
 
Relative Impact of the Reform across the Firm Distribution 
Overall, results suggest that firms at higher quantiles increased their level of tax payments by 
more than firms at lower quantiles. However, this may simply reflect that firms at higher quantiles 
paid more taxes to begin with. Thus, it is interesting to study whether firms at higher quantiles 
increased their tax payments proportionally more  than firms at lower quantiles (relative to their 
respective initial tax payments). For this purpose, we analyze the effects of the reform on the growth 
rate of tax revenue across the firm distribution. 
We approximate the effect of increased punishment on the percentage change of corporate 
profit taxes by transforming the dependant variable to logarithms. We estimate D, DD, and DDD 
models similar to the ones described above. Logarithms help in the comparison of different firms 
                                                 
45 Note that the statistical significance of the coefficient at the 50
th quantile for the placebo DDD model goes away with 
small changes in the specification or the data sample; while other results remain robust. 19 
 
across the distribution because the tax performance is normalized.
46 Results presented in Table B4 
and Figure C2
47 confirm that tax payments increased proportionally more for firms at the upper tail 
of the distribution (tax payments increased by 14 percent at the 90
th quantile but only 12 percent at 
the 70
th quantile based on the DD specification).  
 
Robustness Checks 
Table B5 presents a number of robustness checks. The availability of data for four years 
before the reform  allows us  to understand the underlying trend  in  corporate profit taxes  with a 
measure of confidence,  and also  to  construct  the counterfactual trend in  a variety of ways.  For 
example,  we  calculate  alternative  trend  lines  across  the  distribution  of  firms  using  data  from 
different pairs of consecutive years, and then take the upper envelope of the different trends as a 
conservative estimate of the counterfactual trend in corporate tax revenue in the absence of the 
reform.  An  alternative  is  to  use  the  average  of  the  different  trends  as  an  estimate  of  the 
counterfactual trend. The average may represent the counterfactual trend more faithfully if the year-
to-year changes in corporate income tax revenue are affected significantly by transitory shocks. As 
shown in Panel A of Table B5, there are similar patterns of tax revenue improvements regardless of 
how the counterfactual is constructed.  
In Panel B of Table B5 we present estimates of the impact of the 2007 reform at different 
quantiles of the tax distribution, but using a different approach. We estimate a conditional quantile 
difference-in-differences  model  following  Koenker  and  Bassett  (1978).
48  Again, results present 
similar patterns as before (although the magnitude of the estimates is somewhat smaller). 
In Panel C of Table B5, we include tax arrears and withholdings as additional covaria tes in 
our DD-DFL models. We control for withholdings to isolate the impact of hikes in withholding rates 
(from 1 to 2 percent of income) occurring in mid-2007
49; and we include tax arrears in order to try to 
                                                 
46However, one can argue that as a measure of overall revenue effects of the 2007 reform, logarithms might be too 
stringent a metric, as there can be significant increase in the  average tax revenue (per firm) without a perceptible 
increase in the growth rate. 
47Figure C2 plots the percentage increase in corporate profit taxes (y -axis) at every possible quantile (x -axis) for the 
different models (DFL, DD-DFL and DDD-DFL). Graphs in levels are difficult to interpret as distributions are highly 
skewed.    
48 The model we estimate is                       
  
   t i
QDD
t i
QDID X Post Treat Post Treat y , 2 1 0 ,
, ,
min arg ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( . 
Given that we are not interested in the coefficient estimates of covariates, the methodology used in this paper has some 
advantages over Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) conditional quantile regressions. Both approaches use covariates to make 
DD assumptions more plausible. However, our approach does not impose linear relationships that are difficult to justify 
theoretically; and it does not impose constant marginal returns over time. Moreover, our approach is robust to censoring 
and computationally simple. Although an extension of Koenker and Bassett (1978) suggested by Powell (1984) and 
implemented by Buckhinsky (1994) is robust to censoring; this extension may require significant computational time, 
and at times fails to converge.  
49 An increase in withholding rates is likely to improve compliance only for firms whose tax payments  is close to the 
amount withheld (most likely small firms); but we find a larger increase in tax payments for firms at the right tail of the 
tax distribution (whose tax payments are likely to be higher than the amount withheld). Additional tests are availa ble 20 
 
isolate the prison effect (non-monetary punishment) from increases in the interest rate on tax arrears 
(monetary punishment). Controlling for these additional variables results in a smaller impact of the 
effect of the reform, but still large in economic terms and statistically significant.
50 
Finally, in Panel D of Table B5, we exclude from the data sample firms that belong to the 
LTU tax scheme, where firms are subject to higher monitoring. Again, we still find t hat the impact 
of the reform is economically large and statistically significant.  
 
6. Extensive Margin  
The analysis thus far has focused exclusively on the intensive margin, that is, on firms that 
are part of the tax net and file tax returns in consecutive years. In this section, we examine the 
impact of the reform on the extensive margin by assessing its effects on the firms’ choices to file a 
tax return. 
Every fiscal period, firms that are not part of the tax net (firms that did not file returns in the 
past) can choose between the following: (a) “entering” the tax net by filing a return and becoming 
part of the formal economy,
51 and (b) not filing and remaining in the shadow economy.  To study 
firm entry into the tax net, we identify the “new filers” among the set of firms that file to the SRI in 
year t. That is, we define an indicator that equals to one  ) 1 (  it Entry if a firm that files a tax return in 
year t did not file a return in year t-1. This indicator equals zero  ) 0 (  t i Entry if the firm filed a tax 
return both in years t and t-1.
52 
To estimate the impact of the reform on  firm’s  entry  into  the  tax  net,  we  compare  the 
conditional probability of filing a tax return before and after the reform. In particular, the parameter 
of interest is  06 07     
Entry D , which is obtained by estimating the  following linear probability 
model
53: 
t i t i t t i u X Entry , , ,        (7) 
Where t are year fixed effects and u is a random component. As it was discussed in the preceding 
sections, this estimate may overestimate the impact of the reform if there are any preexisting upward 
trends in tax filings. Such trend may be driven by factors such as economic growth or increased 
efficiency in the program of tax agents who work out in the streets to bring potential taxpayers out of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
from the authors. Specifically, given that withholding rates did not increase for all sectors, we test whether there is any 
difference  in  the  effect  of  increased  punishment  for  different  sectors.  We  find  that  the  mean  effect  is  statistically 
equivalent for all sectors (except agriculture).  
50The only exception is at the 90
th quantile were the effect of higher punishment is no longer statistically significant. 
51 Firms are considered to be part of the tax net if they file a tax return, even if this return  is incomplete or has incorrect 
information. 
52 Notice that our approach allows us to study the probability of entry conditioned on filing a tax return in the current 
year. 
53 Similar results are obtained when estimating probit and logit models. Results are available from the authors. 21 
 
the shadows of informality. To alleviate these concerns, we follow the same strategy used to analyze 
the  intensive  margin  and  estimate  difference-in-difference  (DD)  and  difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) estimates of the impact of the reform on entry; these estimates are computed as 
) ( ) ( 05 06 06 07         
Entry DD  and      ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 04 05 05 06 05 06 06 07                 
Entry DDD , 
respectively.
54  
We also analyze the effect of the reform on firm’s exit out of the tax net. For instance, firms 
that have filed a return during year t-1 can choose between: (a) filing again in year t, and (b) exiting 
the tax net. To spot firms that “exit” the tax net in year t, we create an indicator that equals to one 
) 1 (  it Exit if a firm that filed a tax return in year t-1 does not file a return in year t. This indicator 
equals zero  ) 0 (  t i Exit if the firm filed a tax return in both year t and t-1.
55 To estimate the impact of 
the reform on firm’s exit, we estimate linear probability models and compute D, DD and DDD 
estimates using the same procedure as with the entry models. 
 
Extensive Margin Results 
Extensive margin results are shown in Table B6. In addition to the results for the reform in 
2007, we also present a set of placebo estimates where possible. We find that the probability of entry 
into the tax net increased as a result of increased punishment in 2007; while the probability of exit 
decreased. For our preferred model (DDD), the probability of entry increased by 6 percent; while the 
probability of exit fell by almost 1 percent.  However, note that the placebo estimates for both entry 
and exit in case of the DD estimator are statistically significant. This implies that the estimates may 
be picking up the effects of some other omitted time-varying variables. We can treat the placebo 
estimate as a measure of this bias, and thus a more credible estimate of the 2007 reform would need 
to subtract the placebo estimate.  In case of entry into the tax net, the placebo estimate is numerically 
small, and when we subtract it for the DD estimate for the 2007 reform, the resulting estimate of the 
impact of the reform is small but not insignificant.  The same is, however, not true for the estimate of 
the  effects  of  2007  reform  on  the  probability  of  exit  from  the  tax  net;  subtracting  the  placebo 
estimate alters the sign of the effect (makes it positive), and it becomes very small in magnitude.  
The results thus provide strong evidence that the higher punishment in 2007 has had positive effect 
on the probability of entering into the tax net.  But its effect on the probability of exit from the tax 
net is not robust. 
Interestingly, however, an increase in the number of firms filing a tax return (even when 
coupled  with  a  decrease  in  firm  exit)  does  not  ensure  that  tax  revenues  will  increase  by  any 
                                                 
54 We include in each regression only the necessary number of periods to be able to identify the parameters of interest. 
55 Notice that we study the probability of exit conditioned on filing a tax return in the past year.  22 
 
economically meaningful amount. Indeed, the majority of the firms that enter/exit the tax net tend to 
be smaller firms that claim zero taxes (86 percent of entrants and 78 percent of firms exiting the tax 
net claimed zero taxes between 2007 and 2006).
56 Most importantly, higher punishment failed to 
increase firms’ probability of declaring positive taxes.
57 These results are consistent with previous 
results, because the decision to claim positive or zero taxes is more relevant for firms at the lower 
tail of the distribution, precisely where we did not find any revenue improvements at the intensive 
margin.   
   
7. Conclusions  
This paper analyzes the effects of a reform to the tax code in Ecuador during 2007 that 
introduced stricter punishment for tax evasion. At its core, the new legislation introduced reclusion 
from 1 to 6 years as a punishment for non-compliance, and made a firm’s CFO liable for tax-crimes. 
We take advantage of a rich firm level administrative data set from Ecuador with actual tax-return 
and financial-statement data for the universe of corporations both before and after the reform (from 
2003 to 2007). 
We study the effects  of higher punishment  (especially imprisonment  for tax evasion) on 
corporate income taxes both at the intensive and the extensive margins. At the intensive margin, 
increased punishment seems to increase tax revenues on average (by about 10 percent). However, 
this estimate masks the fact that, tax revenues increased only above the 70
th quantile. Thus, our 
results suggest that focusing on mean impacts can mask important heterogeneity in the impact of tax 
reforms. Results for the extensive margin suggest that, while a number of firms began to file taxes 
after the reform, most of them claimed zero taxes. 
The results presented in this paper have important policy implications. We find that higher 
non-monetary punishment such as a credible threat of imprisonment improves taxpayer compliance 
significantly in developing countries. Thus, a package of administrative reforms –which combines 
higher punishment with steps to make the threat of punishment credible– is likely to substantially 
raise government revenue. The evidence also indicates that a credible higher punishment expands the 
tax base by increasing entry into the tax net.
58  However, the expansion in the tax base yields very 
little revenue for the government. The results thus imply that it may not be efficient to use s carce 
enforcement resources on small firms in an attempt to expand the tax base for corporate income tax.  
                                                 
56 Firms may prefer to comply with the requirement to file, but still evade taxes if the expected return of being caught 
hiding from the tax authority is lower than the expected return of being caught misreporting (i.e. it may be less costly for 
the tax authority to find a firm located in a central area than it is to audit the firms’ books).   
57To measure the impact of the reform on the probability of claiming positive taxes, we estimate linear probability 
models similar to equation (7), but where the dependant variable is defined as I(Tax>0).  
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A. Descriptive Tables 
 
Table A1: 2007 Reforms to the Tax Code 
 
Articles  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
(1)  Minor ordinary reclusion as a 
punishment for tax crimes 
 Not available (milder forms of 
prison available for firm's legal 
representative only) 
1-6 years depending on the crime 
(2)  Responsibility for tax crimes   Only Firm’s legal representative 
(and in some cases the 
accountant) 
Also the CFO and  anybody who 
controls the firm’s economic activity 
(if involved in the evasion scheme) 
(3)  End to tax-related legal actions  Payment of tax debt, death, or 
prescription 
Payment does not end a tax-related 
legal action 
(4)  Interest rate for tax arrears   1.1 times the reference rate  1.5 times the reference rate 
(5)  Surcharge for non-declared income 
discovered by the SRI through tax 
assessments  
Pay only the additional taxes 
assessed plus interest 
Pay a 20% surcharge in addition to 
pre-reform amount  
(6)  Requirement to contest SRI tax 
assessments at court 
































Table A2: Dependant Variable, Summary Statistics 
 
   2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  All years 
Real Tax [$ Ths.]                   
mean  7.66  8.83  10.04  11.54  14.32  10.61 
SD  92.70  105.26  109.66  125.24  142.92  117.47 
max  6,146  7,096  5,248  6,758  7,890  7,890 
min  0  0  0  0  0  0 
% change     15%  14%  15%  24%    
                   
Log(Real Tax)                   
mean  4.15  4.38  4.57  4.82  5.10  4.62 
SD  3.62  3.62  3.65  3.68  3.80  3.69 
max  15.63  15.78  15.47  15.73  15.88  15.88 
min  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                    
Obs.  27,501  28,715  29,764  30,980  32,405  149,365 
             
Notes: The dependant variable is real taxes (measured in $thousands, and logarithms). When real tax is measured in logs, 
we add one unit in order to include firms that generated no taxes. The sample for this table also includes firms that did not 
file taxes in consecutive years and firms created after 2003. 
 
Table A3: Explanatory Variables, Summary Statistics 
 
    Mean  SD  Max  Min  Obs. 
Real Assets [$ Ths.]  950  10,853  1,514,545  0  149,365 
Real Income [$ Ths.]  1,230  9,132  682,426  0  149,365 
Leverage   0.8  7.1  1,744  0  149,365 
Fixed to total assets   0.3  0.3  1  0  149,365 
1(Costs>0)   0.5  0.5  n.a.  n.a.  149,365 
Real Costs [$ Ths.]  464  5161  464,944  0  149,365 
Withholdings [$ Ths.]  8  68  6,707  0  149,365 
Arrears [$ Ths.]  12  168  27,135  0  149,365 
           
Notes:  Explanatory variables were selected following the tax law in Ecuador and the literature on corporate tax compliance 
and ETRs. Real assets are a proxy for firm size. Real income is a proxy for firm profitability. Leverage is measured as the 
ratio of total debt (sum of current and noncurrent liabilities) to total assets. Fixed to total assets is measured as the ratio of net 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Costs are defined as the dollar value of annual local purchases (costs are tax 
deductable). Withholdings helps to control for changes in withholding rates in Ecuador. Arrears help to control for changes in 
interest rates on outstanding tax obligations. The sample for this table includes firms that did not file taxes in consecutive 








B. Estimates of the Impact of Higher Punishment  
Table B1: Intensive Margin, Mean Results in Levels [$ Thousands]    
 
  PANEL A: Full Sample (Tax0)    PANEL B: Subsample (Tax>0) 
 
(1)  
Year of the Reform 
(2) 
Placebo   
(1) 
Year of the Reform 
 (2)  
Placebo 
           
DDD  1.642***  -0.778    2.172***   -1.122 
SE  (0.529)   (0.540)    (0.545)   (0.819) 
              
DD  1.547***   -0.101    2.159***   -0.029 
SE  (0.294)   (0.277)    (0.324)   (0.301) 
              
D  1.809***  0.715***    2.118***   0.477 
SE  (0.314)  (0.270)    (0.449)   (0.398) 
           
Notes: Robust SE in parenthesis. The dependant variable is real tax ($ thousands). Covariates include real income, real assets, 
leverage, fixed to total assets, 1(costs), and real costs. The actual treatment period is 2006-07. The placebo treatment period is 
2005-06. For the year of the reform, the parameters of interest are defined as follows:   
] , | [ ] , | [ 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E
D    ; and       ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ 05 06 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E
DD      ; and 
            ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ ] , | [ 04 05 05 06 05 06 06 07 t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E t X Y E
DDD           
There are approximately 24,000 and 15,000 firm observations per year for Panel A and Panel B, respectively.  
 
Table B2: Descriptive Analysis 
 
PANEL A: Real Tax     PANEL B: Covariates 
   2006  2007  % Change      2006  2007  % Change 
Levels [$ Ths.]          Real Assets [$ Ths.]  1,439  1,517  5% 
mean  20  27  33%       (14,462)  (14,639)    
30th quantile  0.031  0.027  -11%    Real Income [$ Ths.]  1,901  2,061  8% 
50th quantile  0.563  0.738   31%       (13,840)  (15,216)    
75th quantile  3.662  4.983   36%    Leverage   0.67   0.68   1% 
90th quantile  14.816  20.171   36%       (1.26)  (1.47)    
99th quantile  270.105  354.595   31%    fixed to total assets  0.28  0.28  1% 
Logs             (0.30)  (0.30)    
mean  5.40  5.54  0.15    1(costs>0)  0.50   0.49   -1% 
30th quantile  3.45  3.34  -0.11       (0.50)  (0.50)    
50th quantile  6.33  6.61   0.27    Costs [$ Ths.]  691  752  9% 
75th quantile  8.21  8.51   0.31      (7,408)  (7,773)    
90th quantile  9.60  9.91   0.31           
99th quantile  12.51  12.78   0.27           
                 
Share 0’s   25%  26%             
Obs.  23,863  23,863             
                 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. When real tax is measured in logs, we add one unit in order to include firms that 




Table B3: Intensive Margin, Quantile Results in Levels [$ Thousands]  
 
   PANEL A: Year of the Reform 
   30th  40th  50
th  60th  70th  80th  90
th 
                     
DDD  -0.008  -0.008  0.050  0.106  0.343**  0.521**  1.970** 
   (0.006)  -0.008  (0.037)  (0.082)  (0.142)  (0.252)  (0.921) 
                       
DD  -0.006  0.010  0.095***  0.207***  0.497***  0.935***  2.713*** 
   (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.033)  (0.068)  (0.126)  (0.240)  (0.685) 
                       
D  -0.002  0.041***  0.169***  0.370***  0.843***  1.716***  4.438*** 
   (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.081)  (0.174)  (0.652) 
                    
   PANEL B: Placebo 
   30th  40th  50
th  60th  70th  80th  90
th 
                      
DDD  0.001  0.019  0.069**  0.120  0.083  0.248  0.111 
   (0.003)  0.019  (0.029)  (0.067)  (0.123)  (0.290)  (1.072) 
                       
DD  0.002  0.018*  0.045**  0.101**  0.154*  0.415**  0.744 
   (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.021)  (0.041)  (0.084)  (0.162)  (0.619) 
                       
D  0.004***  0.031***  0.074***  0.164***  0.346***  0.781***  1.725*** 
   (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.043)  (0.105)  (0.470) 
                     
Notes: Firms pay zero taxes up to approximately the 30th quantile. Bootstrapped SE in parenthesis (50 replications). Dependant 
variable is real tax ($ Thousands). Covariates include real income, real assets, leverage, fixed to total assets, 1(costs), and real costs. 
For Panel A (year of the reform), the treatment period is 2006-07; while for Panel B, the placebo treatment period is 2005-06. The 
parameters of interest (in the year of the reform) for each quantile  are defined as follows:   
    06
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DD             ; and 















7 t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q
DDD                       .  
There are approximately 24,000 firm observations per year. 
Note that the statistical significance of the coefficient at the 50th quantile for the placebo, goes away with small changes in the 
specification of the model or the data sample; while other results remain robust.  27 
 
Table B4: Intensive Margin, Quantile Results (logs) 
 
   PANEL A: Year of the Reform 
   30th  40th  50
th  60th  70th  80th  90
th 
                
DDD  -0.148  -0.123  0.010  0.012  0.079  0.049  0.088 
   (0.692)  -0.123  (0.115)  (0.096)  (0.075)  (0.087)  (0.111) 
                       
DD  -0.365  -0.049  0.088  0.091  0.118***  0.107**  0.138** 
   (0.381)  (0.106)  (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.066) 
                       
D  -0.057  0.190***  0.267***  0.262***  0.283***  0.280***  0.282*** 
   (0.151)  (0.058)  (0.037)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.035) 
               
   PANEL B: Placebo 
   30th  40th  50
th  60th  70th  80th  90
th 
                      
DDD  -0.743  0.270  0.250**  0.144  0.013  0.015  0.000 
   (0.955)  0.270  (0.126)  (0.092)  (0.084)  (0.095)  (0.107) 
                       
DD  -0.217  0.074  0.078  0.078  0.040  0.058  0.050 
   (0.443)  (0.103)  (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.050) 
                       
D  0.308*  0.239***  0.180***  0.171***  0.165***  0.173***  0.144*** 
   (0.169)  (0.074)  (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
                     
Notes: Firms pay zero taxes up to approximately the 30th quantile. Bootstrapped SE in parenthesis (50 replications). Dependant 
variable is log(real tax+1). Covariates include log(real income+1), log(real assets+1), leverage, fixed to total assets, 1(costs), and 
log(real costs+1). For Panel A (year of the reform), the treatment period is 2006-07; while for panel B, the placebo treatment period is 
2005-06. The parameters of interest (in the year of the reform) for each quantile  are defined as follows: 
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7 t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q t Y Q
DDD                       . 
There are approximately 24,000 firm observations per year. 
For  our  application,  regressions  in  logs  underestimate  the  percentage  increase  in  tax  revenue.  Log  regressions  measure  the 
percentage change in taxes between 07 and 06 (where the base is 06) minus the percentage change in taxes between 06 and 05 
(where the base is 05). However, it would be preferable to always use 06 as the base for calculating the percentage change in tax 













Table B5: Intensive Margin, Quantile Robustness Checks 
 
   PANEL A: Alternative Trends Diff-in-Diff  
  30th  40th  50
th  60
th  70th  80th  90
th 
               
Envelope  -0.007**  0.001  0.048  0.181***  0.379***  0.857***  2.655*** 
  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.032)  (0.064)  (0.113)  (0.263)  (0.786) 
               
Average  -0.007**  0.009  0.068***  0.225***  0.489***  1.097***  3.143*** 
  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.044)  (0.085)  (0.163)  (0.620) 
               
   PANEL B: Conditional Quantile Diff-in-Diff  
   30th  40th  50
th  60
th  70th  80th  90
th 
                     
Koenker 
& Basset 
-0.001  0.004  0.0189***  0.0778***  0.215***  0.375***  0.638*** 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.019) 
                
   PANEL C: Additional Covariates  
   30th  40th  50
th  60
th  70th  80th  90
th 
                      
DDD  -0.011**  -0.017  -0.018  0.04  0.091  0.208  0.262 
   (0.004)  (0.021)  (0.044)  (0.099)  (0.195)  (0.396)  (1.091) 
                
DD  -0.010***  -0.006  0.028  0.135**  0.263**  0.496**  0.624 
   (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.106)  (0.207)  (0.827) 
               
D  -0.009***  0.012  0.087***  0.264***  0.573***  1.145***  2.130*** 
  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.040)  (0.075)  (0.145)  (0.566) 
                       
   PANEL D: non-LTU Taxpayers  
   30th  40th  50
th  60
th  70th  80th  90
th 
                      
DDD  -0.006*  -0.010  0.005  0.063  0.155  0.356*  0.886* 
   (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.030)  (0.052)  (0.101)  (0.184)  (0.513) 
                       
DD  -0.005  0.00  0.040**  0.129***  0.248***  0.546***  1.224*** 
   (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.134)  (0.337) 
                      
D  -0.003  0.016*  0.087***  0.223***  0.446***  0.947***  2.009*** 
  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.041)  (0.089)  (0.204) 
                       
Notes: Firms pay zero taxes up to approximately the 30th quantile. For panels A, C, and D bootstrapped SE in parenthesis (50 
replications). In all models the dependant variable is real tax ($ Thousands). For panels A, B, and D covariates include real income, 
real assets, leverage, fixed to total assets, 1(costs), and real costs. For panel C, the model includes the same covariates as in prior 
models  plus  real  withholdings  and  real  arrears.  In  all  panels  the  treatment  period  is  2006-07  (year  of  the  reform).  There  are 
approximately 24,000 firm observations per year. 
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Table B5: Extensive Margin 
 
  
Panel A:  
Probability of Entry 
 
Panel B:  




Probability of Filing 
Positive Taxes 
 
 (1)  




   (1)  




   (1)  




                 
DDD  0.064***  NA    -0.009***  NA    -0.016***  -0.002 
   (0.006)       (0.005)       (0.006)  (0.007) 
                        
                        
DD  0.071***  0.013***    -0.017***  -0.025***    -0.018***  -0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
                        
                        
D  0.079***  0.012***    -0.004**  0.011***    -0.014***  0.004** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
                   
Notes: Robust SE in parenthesis. Linear probability models. Covariates include real income, real assets, leverage, fixed to 
total assets, 1(costs), real costs, tax arrears and withholdings. A placebo estimate is not available for the DDD specification 

































Notes: For our application, regressions in logs underestimate the percentage increase in tax revenue. Log regressions measure the 
percentage change in taxes between 07 and 06 (where the base is 06) minus the percentage change in taxes between 06 and 05 
(where the base is 05). However, 06 should always be used as the base for calculating the percentage change in tax revenue. Given 
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Not for Publication: DFL Methodology 
To keep our exposition self-contained, we provide a careful description of the 
DFL  approach  using  the  same  notation  as  in  Leibbrandt,  Levinshon  and  McCrary 
(2010). Let  Y  be our variable of interest (log taxes) and  0 t and  1 t  refer to the two 
mutually  exclusive  periods  we  analyze.  The  cumulative  probability  function  Y   in 
period  0 t  is defined as 
          dx t T x h t T x y F t T y Y t T y F ) | ( ) , | ( } | Pr{ ) | ( 0 0 0 0   (1) 
Where  T  is  a  random  variable  describing  the  period  from  which  an  observation  is 
drawn and  x is a particular draw of observed attributes of individual characteristics 
from a random vector  X .  ) , | ( 0 t T x y F   is the (conditional) cumulative distribution of 
Y given that a particular set of attributes  x have been picked, and  ) | ( 0 t T x h   is the 
probability density of individual attributes evaluated at  x. The cumulative probability 
function of Y  in period  1 t  is defined similarly.  
Suppose we like to assess how the distribution of Y (taxes) in period  0 t (2006) 
would look like if the individual attributes  x (real-income and assets, for example) 
were  the  same  as  in  period  1 t   (2007).  We  denote  this  counterfactual  as 
1 0 t t F  and 
express it symbolically as
59 
     dx t T x h t T x y F F t t ) | ( ) , | ( 1 0 1 0   (2) 
In  order  to  compute  such  counterfactual,  Bayes'  rule  is  used  to  obtain 
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   (3) 
One may use expression (3) to substitute  ) | ( 1 t T x h   in equation (1) and obtain 
that 
      dx x t T x h t T x y F y F t t t t ) ( ) | ( ) , | ( ) (
1 0 1 0 0 0      (4) 
Notice that this expression differs from equation (1) only by  ) (
1 0 x t t   . DFL refer to 
                                                 
59 The subscript “ 1 0 t t  ” indicates that the attributes data from period  0 t  will be “replaced” by data 
from period  1 t .   37 
 
) (
1 0 x t t     as  “weights”  that  should  be  applied  when  computing  the  counterfactual 
distribution of our variable of interest. However, given that the weights are unknown, 
they need to be estimated.  
To be specific, as in Leibbrandt, Levinshon and McCrary (2009), we summarize 
the estimation algorithm for the counterfactual given that a random sample of  0 N and 
1 N  observations for periods  0 t  and  1 t  is available: 
1)  Estimate  ) ( 1 t T P    using  the  share  of  observations  where  1 t Ti    to  obtain 
) /( ) ( ˆ
1 0 1 1 N N N t T P i    . 
2)  Estimate ) | ( 1 x X t T P   ,  by  estimating  a  logit  model  for  both  periods.  The 
dependent variable equals one if  1 t Ti  , and explanatory variables include the vector of 
individual attributes  i x . 
3) For the subsample of observations where  0 t Ti  , estimate the predicted values from 
the logit 
} ˆ exp{ 1
} ˆ exp{









x X t T P

   , where   ˆ  is the parameter vector from the 
logit regression. Then, compute the estimated weights as 
) ( ˆ 1
) ( ˆ
) | ( ˆ 1
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    
4)  For  the subsample of observations  where  0 t Ti  ,  compute  a  weighted  empirical 
cumulative distribution function. While there are many available options to do this task, 
































where   . 1  is the indicator function. 
It is useful to analyze the differences between the distributions of interest at each 
quantile. Specifically, define    t T y Q  |   as the 
th   quantile of the distribution of Y  
in  period  t.  Similarly,  let    0
* | t T y Q     be the 
th    quantile  of  the  counterfactual 
distribution of Y  if individual attributes where identical to those in  0 t  and notice that 38 
 
*
 Q  is implicitly defined by  ) ( ˆ
1 0 z F t t  .  
To assess how much of the changes in the distribution of  Y  between period  0 t  
and  1 t  can be “explained” by changes in individual attributes  x , we may compute 




1 0 1 t y Q t y Q t y Q t y Q t y Q t y Q              (6) 
The first term measures the “unexplained” part of the changes in the distribution of Y . 
The second term in parenthesis is the portion of the changes that can be explained by 
differences in endowments.  
There is only one subtle difference between our approach and DFL's: rather than 
computing  the  counterfactual  probability  density  function,  we  estimate  the 
counterfactual  cumulative  distribution.  This  is  a  natural  choice  because  the 
counterfactual cumulative distribution remains valid even in cases when the dependent 
variable is censored (as is the case for taxes).  
 